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I. INTRODUCTION
[1]
Deepwater offshore drilling presents a clash of competing interests
that raises legal questions of some novelty. The government and the
public possess a significant interest in obtaining access to geological
information about potential drilling sites, and the proposed techniques for
exploiting the accompanying mineral rights, in order to maintain safety,
health, and the environment.1 On the other hand, companies engaged in
offshore drilling possess a strong and legitimate interest in protecting
Michael A. Greene, S.B., Physics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Juris Doctor
Candidate, Boston College Law School, May 2012. The Author thanks Professor Daniel
Lyons of Boston College Law School for valuable guidance in this undertaking. The
Author expresses his gratitude to Professor Zygmunt J.B. Plater of Boston College Law
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1

See generally The Big Picture: Why Is It So Hard to Stop the Oil Gusher, and Why Was
Such Extreme Deepwater Drilling Allowed in the First Place?, WASHINGTON’S BLOG
(May 23, 2010), http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2010/05/big-picture-why-wasdeepwater-drilling.html [hereinafter The Big Picture] (showing that BP never disclosed
the “detailed geological information, maps and drawings” of its drill site to the federal
government, which might have prevented the drilling before it began).
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proprietary information, which is intrinsic to their ability to compete.2 For
example, disclosure of valuable information regarding a potential offshore
oil reservoir could entice competitors to drill and deplete the same
reservoir from a slightly removed location, resulting in the loss of billions
of dollars of revenue.
[2]
The events of the Deepwater Horizon offshore drilling and
blowout response highlight the risks to public safety, health, and the
environment of nondisclosure of industry data.3 Reports suggest that
responsible parties withheld critical information regarding the structure of
the ocean floor at the Deepwater Horizon drilling site from regulating
agencies.4 Furthermore, past spill response drills have led federal officials
to complain of inadequate industry disclosure to government
representatives, motivated in part by industry’s desire to protect

2

See Nicolas Loris, Initial Response to the Oil Spill Commission Report, FOUNDRY (Jan.
11, 2011, 3:00 PM), http://blog.heritage.org/2011/01/11/initial-response-to-the-oil-spillcommission-report/; see also Elana Schor, Ingredients of Controversial Dispersants Used
on Gulf Spill Are Secrets No More, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/06/09/09greenwire-ingredients-of-controversialdispersants-used-42891.html.
3

See, e.g., Schor, supra note 2; see also Matthew Mosk et al., After Oil Rig Blast, BP
Refused to Share Underwater Spill Footage, ABC NEWS (May 12, 2010),
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/bp-oil-spill-oil-rig-blast-bp-refused/story?id=10624972
&page=1; Transocean Says BP Withholding Information, UPI.COM (Apr. 20, 2010, 2:34
PM),
http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Energy-Resources/2010/08/20/Transoceansays-BP-withholding-information/UPI-2534128232 9259/; Dan Zak, As Oil Spread, Did
BP Battle to Contain the Media?, WASH. POST (June 3, 2010),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/03/AR201006030
0848.html.
4

Evidence shows the geologic structure of deepwater petroleum sites in the Gulf of
Mexico to be comprised of porous and tectonically active salt sheets – a critical
parameter to determining effective methods of capping the blowout – yet reports suggest
BP did not provide regulating agencies with such information. The Big Picture, supra
note 1; Top Expert: Geology Is “Fractured”, Relief Wells May Fail … BP is Using a
“Cloak of Silence”, Refusing to Share Even Basic Data with the Government,
WASHINGTON’S BLOG (Aug. 19, 2010), http://georgewashington2.blogspot.com/
2010/08/top-oil-expert-geology-is-fractured-bp.html.
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proprietary information.5 In addition to its contribution to problems in the
Gulf, inadequate information sharing has also hamstrung federal
regulators tasked with overseeing offshore drilling operations in Alaska.6
[3]
This Article will explore whether the law may require the
disclosure of adequate proprietary information to enable effective
regulation. Part II will discuss the settled law regarding the property
status of trade secrets, the regulatory takings doctrine, the applicability of
the Takings Clause of the United States Constitution to proprietary data,
and the exactions doctrine. Part III will explore the validity of the
mandatory submission of proprietary health, safety, and environmental
data to government regulators, with the guarantee that such data will be
kept secret from competitors and the public. Part IV will then explore the
validity of regulation mandating public disclosure of such proprietary
information, and will discuss the implications for regulation of deepwater
drilling. Finally, Part V will discuss the implications of the exactions
doctrine for the validity of regulation requiring public disclosure of
proprietary health, safety, and environmental data, as viewed through the
lens of land use.
II. TAKINGS CLAUSE PROTECTION FOR PROPRIETARY DATA
A. Trade Secrets as Property Rights
[4]
The threshold question in any evaluation of the constitutionality of
mandatory disclosure of trade secret information is whether that

5

John Solomon & Aaron Mehta, Training Exercises Showed Gaps in Government
Preparedness Before BP Oil Spill, CENT. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (May 12, 2010, 1:34 AM),
http://www.iwatchnews.org/2010/05/11/2676/training-exercises-showed-gapsgovernment-preparedness-bp-oil-spill.
6

U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-276, OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS
DEVELOPMENT ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE WOULD HELP STRENGTHEN THE MINERALS
MANAGEMENT SERVICE’S ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS IN THE NORTH
ALEUTIAN BASIN (2010) (decrying selective sharing of information on a need-to-know
basis within the MMS agency in the Alaska Outer Continental Shelf region as preventing
agency officials from obtaining access to the very reports from which they were required
to produce environmental impact assessments).
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information constitutes property.7 Trade secret protection was originally a
common law doctrine with vague definitional boundaries, and much of
that common law nature persists today.8 For example, trade secret
protection requires no governmental registration, one of its principal
attractions compared to other types of intellectual property.9 In its 1984
decision of Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., the United States Supreme
Court granted recognition to trade secrets as property for Takings Clause
purposes.10
[5]
Mindful of precedent mandating that property interests must stem
from a source independent of the Constitution, such as state law, the Court
held trade secrets recognized as property by relevant state law will be
afforded constitutional protection.11 Thus, the starting point when
evaluating the validity of potential regulation of offshore oil drilling is
7

See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001-03 (1984). See generally Philip
Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24, 31 (1st Cir. 2002).
8

See Julie Piper, I Have A Secret?: Applying the Uniform Trade Secrets Act to
Confidential Information that Does Not Rise to the Level of Trade Secret Status, 12
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 359, 360-64 (2008); see also Elizabeth A. Rowe, Trade
Secret Litigation and Free Speech: Is It Time to Restrain the Plaintiffs?, 50 B.C. L. REV.
1425, 1432-33 & nn.41-42 (2009); David V. Radack, The Uniform Trade Secrets Act,
TMS (Jan. 2006), http://www.tms.org/pubs/journals/JOM/matters/matters-0601.html.
See generally UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (1985).
9

See Rowe, supra note 8, at 1432.

10

See Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1003-04.

11

See Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1001, 1003-04; Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v.
Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980) (“‘Property interests . . . are not created by the
Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules
or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law . . . .” (quoting
Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 577 (1972))); see also Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v.
Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 84 (1980) (“Nor as a general proposition is the United States, as
opposed to the several States, possessed of residual authority that enables it to define
‘property’ in the first instance.”); Chevron Chem. Co. v. Costle, 641 F.2d 104, 114-15
(3d Cir. 1981) (holding property rights must be established by some state law because
“‘[t]he common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky but the articulable voice
of some sovereign or quasi-sovereign that can be identified . . . .” (quoting S. Pac. Co. v.
Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting))).

4
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analyzing each regulated company’s trade secret protection as granted
under state law.12 If the relevant state provides no trade secret protection
for the type of health, safety, and environmental data at issue, further
takings analysis is unnecessary.13
[6]
Trade secrets are protected in every state in one form or another.14
The vast majority of states – governing the overwhelming majority of
United States corporations – have enacted the Uniform Trade Secret Act
(“UTSA”), which clearly defines the types of proprietary data at issue as
protectable trade secrets.15 Among states that have not enacted the UTSA,
Texas is a particularly interesting example, both because of its proximity
to the Gulf of Mexico and because federal agencies have held the Texas
corporation BP Exploration & Production, Inc. (“BP E&P”) a Responsible
Party for the Deepwater Horizon cleanup.16 Though the Texas legislature
12

See Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1001.

13

See id. at 1001, 1014.

14

ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL
AGE 35 (5th ed. 2010).
15

See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i) (1985) (defining a trade secret as
“information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method,
technique, or process that: (i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential,
from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means
by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the
subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.”);
MERGES, supra note 14, at 36 (stating that forty-four states and the District of Columbia
have enacted the UTSA). Note that Delaware, by far the most popular legal domicile for
corporations, has adopted the UTSA. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2001 to 2009
(2011); Mohsen Manesh, Delaware and the Market for LLC Law: A Theory of
Contractibility and Legal Indeterminacy, 52 B.C. L. REV. 189, 190, 195-96 & 196 nn.3031 (2011) (“A majority of publicly traded companies and sixty percent of the Fortune
tune [sic] 500 are incorporated in Delaware. No other state even approaches Delaware’s
market share.”) (footnotes omitted).
16

Notice of Intent to Conduct Restoration Planning (Pursuant to 15 C.F.R. Section
990.44) – Discharge of Oil from the Deepwater Horizon Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit
and the Subsea Macondo Well Into the Gulf of Mexico, NOAA & NAT’L RES. TRS. (Apr.
20, 2010), http://www.darrp.noaa.gov/southeast/deepwater_horizon/pdf/Deepwater_
Horizon_Final_NOI.pdf (holding BP Exploration & Production Inc. a responsible party
for purposes of the Deepwater Horizon cleanup); Letter from Susan Combs, Tex.

5

Richmond Journal of Law and Technology

Vol. XVII, Issue 4

has spurned the UTSA, Texas courts nonetheless apply the Restatement of
Torts definition of trade secrets, which clearly defines confidential
competitive data as a trade secret.17 Thus, like Monsanto’s proprietary
health, safety and environmental data, a deepwater oil company’s
proprietary geological health, safety, and environmental data would likely
be protected by state law under either the UTSA or the Restatement
definition of trade secret, and are further protected by the Takings Clause
of the United States Constitution.18
B. Takings and the Regulatory Takings Doctrine
[7]
Where an act of government conveys title to an interest in property
from the owner to the public, the Takings Clause states that the owner
must receive “just compensation.”19 This is the ordinary takings doctrine,
which applies whether the interest conveyed is full title or merely an
easement.20 By contrast, where regulation does not convey an interest but
Comptroller, to State of Tex., filing no. 800338839 (filed May 6, 2004), available at
https://ourcpa.cpa.state.tx.us/coa/servlet/cpa.app.coa.CoaLetter
(certifying
BP
Exploration & Production as incorporated in the State of Texas and in good standing as
of November 22, 2010); see Ryan C. Hudson et al., State Law IP Litigation Issues, 45
ADVOCATE (Texas) 110, 110 (2008) (“Texas trade secret law substantially overlaps – but
does not entirely duplicate – the Uniform Trade Secrets Act . . . .”).
17

See Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, 314 S.W.2d 763, 776 (Tex. 1958) (adopting the
Restatement definition of trade secrets); Parker Barber & Beauty Supply, Inc. v. Wella
Corp., No. 03-04-00623-CV, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 8841, at *50 n.19 (Oct. 11, 2006)
(“Texas courts continue to follow the definition of trade secrets, as well as the six factors
used to identify a trade secret, set forth in section 757 of the original Restatement of Torts
. . . .”); see also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939) (defining a trade
secret as “any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in
one’s business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over
competitors who do not know or use it,” and which is in fact secret); Hudson, supra note
16, at 110-11.
18

See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984).

19

U.S. CONST. amend. V (prohibiting the taking of “private property . . . for public use,
without just compensation”).
20

See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994) (“Without question, had
the city simply required petitioner to dedicate a strip of land . . . for public use, rather
than conditioning the grant of her permit to redevelop her property on such a dedication,

6
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merely restricts the use an owner may make of his or her property, courts
apply the regulatory takings doctrine.21
[8]
The regulatory takings doctrine provides the basis for determining
the validity of land-use regulations using the three famous Penn Central
factors: (i) “the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant[;]” (ii)
interference with reasonable “investment backed expectations[;]” and (iii)
“the character of the governmental action.”22 Assumed in such cases is
that government must occasionally diminish the value of private property
in furthering the public interest.23 But where such reductions are so severe
as to be tantamount to a direct appropriation or an ouster, the regulatory
takings doctrine acts “to bar Government from forcing some people alone
to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne
by the public as a whole.”24
[9]
Trade secrets protected under state law are also protected under the
Takings Clause of the United States Constitution, though they are not
land.25 Public disclosure of a trade secret constitutes the destruction of its
a taking would have occurred.”); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831
(1987) (“Had California simply required the Nollans to make an easement across their
beachfront available to the public on a permanent basis in order to increase public access
to the beach . . . we have no doubt there would have been a taking.”); see also Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982) (holding a regulation
requiring apartment buildings to allow the installation of television cable boxes a taking
and invalid on its face).
21

See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); Pa. Coal
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
22

Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124; see Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1005.

23

Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 413 (“Government hardly could go on if to some extent values
incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the
general law.”).
24

Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); see Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005) (“[G]overnment regulation of private property may, in
some instances, be so onerous that its effect is tantamount to a direct appropriation or
ouster . . . such ‘regulatory takings’ may be compensable under the Fifth Amendment.”).
25

See U.S. CONST. amend. V; Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1003-04.

7
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owner’s entire property interest in that trade secret, and thus forced
disclosure – far beyond being a mere use restriction upon that property –
would seem to implicate the ordinary takings doctrine.26 Nonetheless, the
United States Supreme Court in Monsanto evaluated regulations requiring
such public disclosure within the regulatory takings framework, much as it
has evaluated the validity of restrictions upon the use of land.27
C. Exactions Doctrine
[10] Where government entities condition the grant of a requested
government permit or benefit upon the conveyance of a private property
right to the public, the exactions doctrine is implicated.28 The purpose of
the exactions doctrine is to prevent the government from exploiting an
individual’s chance need for a government permit to unfairly accomplish
an uncompensated condemnation of property.29
1. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission and the Essential Nexus
[11] In its landmark 1987 decision in Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission, the United States Supreme Court first introduced the
“essential nexus” requirement when evaluating exactions.30 In Nollan, the
California Coastal Commission conditioned the approval of a
homeowner’s building permit petition upon the homeowner allowing the
26

See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(ii) (providing a definitional requirement that
trade secrets be subject to reasonable attempts to maintain secrecy); Monsanto, 467 U.S.
at 1002 (“If an individual discloses his trade secret to others who are under no obligation
to protect the confidentiality of the information, or otherwise publicly discloses the
secret, his property right is extinguished.”).
27

See Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1005, 1016; see also Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444
U.S. 164, 174 (1979); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
28

See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 386-87 (1994); see also Nollan v. Cal.
Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987).
29

See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 383-84; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841-42; Armstrong v. United
States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
30

Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
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public a lateral easement across its beachfront property, to connect one
public beach with another.31 The Commission based its exaction upon a
finding that the proposed building plan would inhibit the public’s view
and awareness of the public beach from the street, pursuant to a California
statute authorizing the restricting of building projects that “have an
adverse impact on public access to the sea.”32 The state Superior Court
nullified the Commission’s action, finding that the Commission lacked
statutory authority for its actions.33 The California Court of Appeal,
however, reversed the Superior Court’s statutory interpretation, upholding
the Commission’s authority to condition its grant of the building permit
and finding no constitutional infirmity in such action.34
[12] The United States Supreme Court reversed the California courts,
finding the Commission’s exaction an unconstitutional exercise of
government authority.35 In so doing, the Court introduced the exactions
doctrine.36 Put succinctly, the Court ruled that to be valid an exaction
must function as a substitute for a valid prohibition.37 This imposes two
conditions: first, the government must have had the ability to
constitutionally prohibit the proposed building plan outright, due to the
proposed building plan’s impact.38 Second, the exaction the government
requires must accomplish the same purpose as the prohibition for which it
substitutes, or put another way, must be designed to mitigate the same

31

Id. at 828.

32

Id. at 829.

33

See id. (noting the Superior Court interpreted the statute in part to avoid difficult issues
of constitutionality, which turned out to be quite prescient).
34

Id. at 830-31.

35

See id. at 841-42.

36

See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837, 848.

37

See id. at 837.

38

See id at 836-37.
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impacts of the building proposal that the prohibition would address.39
This is the “essential nexus” requirement.40
[13] In the Nollans’ case, the Commission possessed the constitutional
authority to deny the building permit petition proposal outright, or so the
Court assumed, in order to protect the view of the ocean for passersby on
the street.41 The second prong, however, is where the Commission’s
exaction failed.42 The Court stated that an exaction of a viewing spot on
the Nollans’ property to the public beach would have been valid,
preserving the view of and access to the beach from the street.43 It also
intimated that an easement traversing the property from the street to the
beach may not have suffered the same infirmity as the lateral easement.44
In requiring a lateral easement across the Nollans’ property, however, the
exaction failed to accomplish the same purpose as a prohibition on
building.45 In short, the exaction failed to function as a substitute for a
prohibition.46

39

See id. at 836-37.

40

See id. at 837.

41

See id. at 835-36 (“The Commission argues that among these permissible purposes are
protecting the public’s ability to see the beach . . . . We assume, without deciding, that
this is so-in which case the Commission unquestionably would be able to deny the
Nollans their permit outright if their new house . . . would substantially impede these
purposes, unless the denial would interfere so drastically with the Nollans’ use of their
property as to constitute a taking.”).
42

See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 839.

43

See id. at 836 (“[T]he condition would be constitutional even if it consisted of the
requirement that the Nollans provide a viewing spot on their property for passersby with
whose sighting of the ocean their new house would interfere.”).
44

See id. at 836, 838, 840 (“It is quite impossible to understand how a requirement that
people already on the public beaches be able to walk across the Nollans’ property reduces
any obstacles to viewing the beach created by the new house.”).
45

See id.

46

See id. at 836-37.
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2. Dolan v. City of Tigard and Rough Proportionality
[14] The Supreme Court further developed the exactions doctrine in its
1994 decision in Dolan v. City of Tigard.47 In Dolan, a hardware store
owner petitioned the city for a building permit to expand her store, which
would double the size of the store and pave a parking lot.48 Her property
was adjacent to a creek, and part of her property was within the creek’s
100-year floodplain.49 The City Planning Commission conditioned its
approval of Dolan’s petition upon the dedication of the floodplain portion
of her property for an improved storm drainage system, and a further
dedication to the public of a strip of adjacent land for a bicycle and
pedestrian passageway.50 The Commission cited a finding of increased
traffic congestion due to the proposed development, as well as increased
burden on the creek’s ability to handle storm water runoff resulting from
the additional proposed water-resistant paved surfaces.51 Thus, the
Commission followed the teachings of the Court in Nollan, finding the
essential nexus between the impacts of the proposed building and the
exacted dedication designed to address the traffic and runoff problems.52
Accordingly, the Oregon Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
the Commission’s action under Nollan.53

47

See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994).

48

See id. at 379.

49

See id. See generally 18 C.F.R. § 1304.412 (2009) (“100-year floodplain means that
area inundated by the one percent annual chance (or 100-year) flood.”); ROBERT R.
HOLMES, JR. & KAREN DINICOLA, 100-YEAR FLOOD-IT’S ALL ABOUT CHANCE: U.S.
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY GENERAL INFORMATION PRODUCT 106 (2010), available at
http://pubs.usgs.gov/gip/106A (defining a 100-year floodplain as an area inundated by the
one percent annual chance flood, the so-called “100-year flood”).
50

See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 380.

51

Id. at 381-82.

52

See id. at 381-83, 387; Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 836-37 (1987).

53

See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 383; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836-37.
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[15] The United States Supreme Court, nonetheless, struck down the
Commission’s actions as unconstitutional.54 The Court stated the relation
that the exacted dedication must bear to the impacts of the proposed
development must constitute not only a nexus, but be related “both in
nature and extent.”55 The Court clarified that “[n]o precise mathematical
calculation is required[,]” but there must be an individualized showing of
rough proportionality.56 In the case at bar, the Commission had found that
the burdens of the proposed development and the exaction imposed were
related, but had made no showing as to the degree of burden proposed nor
the degree of relief afforded by the exacted remedy.57
[16] Thus, in Dolan the Supreme Court clarified its exactions
jurisprudence, specifying that for exactions to be valid the exacted
dedication to the public must not only function as a substitute for
prohibiting the proposed development, but its remedial effect must be
“roughly proportional” to the impact of the proposed development.58
3. Purely Regulatory Versus Adjudicatory Action
[17] It is potentially significant that both the Nollan and the Dolan
decisions involved the adjudicatory action of government agencies, rather
than pure legislative rulemaking.59 Both cases involved exactions
imposed by city commissions in individually adjudicating a petition for a
building permit.60 Justice Rehnquist emphasized this adjudicatory nature
54

See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 382-83, 396.

55

Id. at 391.

56

Id.

57

Id. at 395-96.

58

Id. at 391 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836-37.

59

See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828-29; Mark Fenster, Regulating
Land Use in a Constitutional Shadow: The Insitutional Contexts of Exactions, 58
HASTINGS L.J. 729, 729, 731, 741 (2007).
60

See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828-29.
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in his opinion for the Court in Dolan.61 Justice Rehnquist distinguished
land-use regulations judged under the regulatory takings doctrine that are
“essentially legislative determinations classifying entire areas of [a]
city[,]” from the individualized determinations and dedications the city
commissions exacted in Nollan and Dolan.62 The Court clearly turned a
mistrustful eye toward individualized exactions as being inherently more
suspect of government usurpation, and requiring greater judicial
scrutiny.63
4. Application of Exactions Doctrine to Trade Secrets
[18] The distinction between adjudicatory and purely legislative actions
in the exactions analysis is of paramount importance to evaluating the
application of the exactions doctrine to deepwater drilling regulation. The
distinction between regulation of land use versus non-land use also is
significant. Courts have not yet addressed whether an exaction of trade
secrets may be controlled by the exactions doctrine.64 As such, the
legality of mandatory disclosure of proprietary data will be analyzed in
Parts III and IV through the regulatory takings framework as expounded in
61

See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385.

62

Id.

63

See id. at 387 (describing the Coastal Commission action in Nollan as “gimmickry”);
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841 (“We are inclined to be particularly careful about the adjective
[i.e., the substantial advancing of a legitimate state interest] where the actual conveyance
of property is made a condition to the lifting of a land-use restriction, since in that context
there is heightened risk that the purpose is avoidance of the compensation requirement,
rather than the stated police-power objective.”); see also San Remo Hotel L.P. v. San
Francisco, 41 P.3d 87, 105 (Cal. 2002) (“The ‘sine qua non’ for application of
Nollan/Dolan scrutiny is thus the ‘discretionary deployment of the police power’ in ‘the
imposition of land-use conditions in individual cases.’”) (citation omitted); Action
Apartment Ass’n v. Santa Monica, 82 Cal. Rptr. 3d 722, 732 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (“Both
the United States and California Supreme Courts have explained the two part
Nollan/Dolan test developed for use in land exaction takings litigation applies only in the
case of individual adjudicative permit approval decisions; not to generally applicable
legislative general zoning decisions.”).
64

See, e.g., Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 702 (1999); Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-1005.
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the Monsanto decision. This Article will return to the exactions doctrine
and viewing the mandatory disclosure of trade secrets through the land use
lens in Part V.
III. LEGALITY OF MANDATORY DISCLOSURE TO GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
[19] Where statutes or regulations expressly grant prohibitions of public
disclosure, the government is clearly within its right to demand health,
safety, and environmental data from private industry, notwithstanding the
proprietary nature of that information.65 First principles of trade secret
doctrine as well as judicial opinion uphold the validity of such mandatory
submission requirements.66 Although industry interests have argued that
even confidential submission of trade secrets to government diminishes
their value and risks disclosure through inadvertent mistake or subsequent
judicial proceedings, courts have rightfully rejected such arguments.67
A. First Principles of Trade Secrets Law
[20] According to first principles of trade secret doctrine, disclosure of
proprietary information to governmental agencies does not diminish the
property interests of the trade secret holders, provided the agency assures
confidentiality.68 The very definition of trade secret is information that
affords its holder an economic advantage over competitors, and regarding
which its holder undertakes reasonable efforts to prevent disclosure to
competitors.69 Because a trade secret’s only legally cognizable value is
65

See infra Parts III.B, IV.

66

See infra Part III.A-B.

67

See, e.g., FTC v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 626 F.2d 966, 972 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862, 876, 877, 883, 885 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (en banc); Cont’l
Oil Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 519 F.2d 31 (5th Cir. 1975).
68

See Owens-Corning, 626 F.2d at 972 n.12.

69

See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i) (1985); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §
757 cmt. b (1939). The Restatement of Torts, widely accepted before the enactment of
the UTSA, defines trade secret as “any formula, pattern, device or compilation of
information which is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to
obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it,” and which is in fact
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the advantage it affords over competitors, sharing trade secret information
confidentially with the government – a non-competitor – does not impinge
upon the trade secret holder’s competitive advantage and thus does not
reduce the property’s value.70 Furthermore, a trade secret holder’s right to
exclude, perhaps the essential property right, is severely circumscribed.71
A cause of action accrues to a trade secret holder only through
misappropriation by wrongdoing; obtainment of trade secret information
by innocent means is non-actionable.72 Because the right to exclude
applies only to misappropriation, the proprietary right in trade secrets is a
limited one, and governmental use of trade secrets, by definition not
misappropriation, infringes no rights of the property holder.73

secret. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939) (emphasis added); see
MERGES ET AL., supra note 14, at 35-36. Similarly, the UTSA, enacted in the
overwhelming majority of states, defines trade secrets as information that “derives
independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to . . .
other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use.” UNIF. TRADE
SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i) (1985) (emphasis added).
70

See Chevron Chem. Co. v. Costle, 641 F.2d 104, 115 (3d Cir. 1981) (finding the
Restatement of Torts § 757 definition of trade secret unavailing for purposes of
establishing a property right in confidential data as against internal agency use, because
§ 757 deals only with liability for public disclosure of trade secrets); see also UNIF.
TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b; Mark Q. Connelly,
Secrets and Smokescreens: A Legal and Economic Analysis of Government Disclosures
of Business Data, 1981 WIS. L. REV. 207, 251 n.210 (noting that a trade secret’s value is
harmed only through public disclosure and where a competitor will obtain that trade
secret information).
71

See Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979) (“In this case, we hold that
the ‘right to exclude,’ so universally held to be a fundamental element of the property
right, falls within [the] category of interests that the Government cannot take without
compensation.”) (footnotes omitted); Int’l News Serv. v. Assoc. Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250
(1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“An essential element of individual property is the legal
right to exclude others from enjoying it.”).
72

See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 1(2), 2, 3 (providing entitlement to relief only for
misappropriation); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 757, 758(a) (providing trade secret
liability only for wrongdoing); MERGES ET AL., supra note 14, at 37 (explaining that trade
secret liability only accrues for information acquired wrongfully).
73

See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 1(2), 2, 3; RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 757, 758(a);
see also Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1010-11 (1984) (stating that there
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B. Judicial Rulings
[21] Courts have given a frosty reception to industry arguments that
confidential disclosures to the government compromise property
interests.74 Industry has argued that disclosure to regulatory agencies
threatens its possessory interests in trade secrets, either through the very
existence of the information outside industry control, or because such
secrets could be revealed to the public through subsequent judicial or
congressional proceedings.75
Nevertheless, courts have universally
rejected constitutional challenges to mandatory submission of trade secrets
to regulatory agencies where confidentiality is maintained.76
is no recognition of frustration of investment-backed expectations except where data is
disclosed to the public).
74

See, e.g., Pharm. Care Mgmt. Assoc. v. Rowe, 307 F. Supp. 2d 164, 179 & n.16 (D.
Me. 2004) (“This Court does not credit PCMA’s fear that the disclosure protections of
[the state statute] are illusory because the information could be revealed in a subsequent
judicial proceeding.”); Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1010-11 (stating that there is no cognizance
of frustration of investment-backed expectations except where data is disclosed to the
public).
75

See FTC v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 626 F.2d 966, 972 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(rejecting contentions that the presence of trade secrets outside a corporation’s control
lessened their value and amounted to a taking); Pharm. Care, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 179
n.16; James T. Halverson, An Analysis of the Oil and Natural Gas Reserve Reporting
Problem: The Government’s Need to Know Versus the Private Company’s Need to
Protect the Confidentiality of Its Sensitive Business Information, 27TH INST. ON OIL &
GAS L. 119, 134-35 (1976) (arguing lack of reliable confidentiality where proprietary
information was released by the agency to a congressional subcommittee).
76

See FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 288, 300 (1965) (enforcing an agency subpoena
duces tecum of confidential, competitively sensitive business information); OwensCorning, 626 F.2d at 968 (enforcing an agency order mandating the submission of
confidential business information, including trade secrets); FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d
862, 876, 877, 883, 885 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (en banc) (enforcing administrative subpoenas
duces tecum of highly sensitive proprietary natural gas reserves data); Cont’l Oil Co. v.
Fed. Power Comm’n, 519 F.2d 31, 32 (5th Cir. 1975) (upholding an agency order
requiring the submission of detailed proprietary natural gas sales information); see also
Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1002, 1010-11 (recognizing takings argument only where agency
disclosed data to public or competitors); Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24, 45 (1st
Cir. 2002) (distinguishing unconstitutional Massachusetts statute mandating public
disclosure of secret cigarette ingredients from Texas statute mandating confidential
submission to state agency); Chevron v. Chemical Co. v. Costle, 641 F.2d 104, 115 (3d
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[22] For example, in FTC v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. the
District of Columbia Circuit enforced a Federal Trade Commission
(“FTC”) order requiring submission of documents containing highly
confidential trade secrets.77 In Owens-Corning, as part of a nonpublic
antitrust investigation of the insulation industry, the FTC issued subpoenas
duces tecum to Owens-Corning and other corporations to produce certain
documents.78 Owens-Corning refused to comply on the grounds that the
documents contained trade secrets, including detailed information on
costs, sales, customers, business plans, and secret processes.79
Owens-Corning argued that inadequate safeguards of confidentiality and
the increased possibility of disclosure due to the documents’ presence
beyond the company’s exclusive control lessened the trade secrets’ value,
amounting to a taking.80 The court rejected these arguments as “devoid of
Cir. 1981) (“[The Restatement definition of trade secrets] affords no help since it deals
with liability for disclosure of trade secrets without a privilege to do so. EPA does not
propose disclosure.”); Pharm. Care, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 179 n.16; Dep’t of Natural Res. v.
Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp., 834 P.2d 134, 144 (Alaska 1991) (distinguishing public
disclosure from mandatory reporting to the state); cf. Jaymar-Ruby, Inc. v. FTC, 651 F.2d
506, 507 (7th Cir. 1981) (refusing to enjoin the FTC from disclosing to state attorneys
general its price fixing investigatory files containing proprietary business information
because no public disclosure or commercial use of secrets was contemplated); Ashland
Oil, Inc. v. FTC, 548 F.2d 977, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (refusing to enjoin the FTC from
transferring to a congressional subcommittee highly competitive trade secret natural gas
reserves estimates submitted to the Commission by plaintiff, because submission to
Congress is not making public). Compare Superior Oil Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory
Comm’n, 563 F.2d 191, 194-95, 202 (5th Cir. 1977) (sustaining an agency order
requiring natural gas producers to submit detailed confidential information concerning
exploration and development-related expenditures where the agency reasonably
considered the burden on the regulated industry and the agency need for the data), with
Union Oil Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 542 F.2d 1036, 1037, 1042-43 (9th Cir. 1976)
(rejecting an order requiring natural gas producers to submit detailed proprietary data on
natural gas reserves because the agency failed to consider the burden on the regulated
industry in more than a summary or cursory manner).
77

Owens-Corning, 626 F.2d at 968-69.

78

Id.

79

Id. at 969 n.1.

80

See id. at 971-72 & n.12.
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any merit,” stating that agency use of the information is not a public
disclosure nor does it interfere with Owens-Corning’s ability to use its
trade secrets, and ordered compliance with the FTC subpoena.81
IV. LEGALITY OF MANDATORY PUBLIC DISCLOSURE
A. Information “Voluntarily” Submitted
[23] In evaluating mandatory public disclosure, some courts afford
great weight to industry’s voluntary submission of trade secrets to
agencies before filing suit, which diminishes or even extinguishes
reasonable investment-backed expectations.82 The most well-known
instance of forced public disclosure is probably in the context of the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”),83 and the
Supreme Court’s Monsanto decision, in which the Court ruled for the first
time that proprietary information constitutes property protected by the
Takings Clause.84
Monsanto challenged Environmental Protection
Agency (“EPA”) regulations under FIFRA that required pesticide
manufacturers to provide health, safety, and environmental data to register
pesticides with the EPA.85 Numerous amendments to FIFRA were made
over the years: before 1972, the statute contained no express promise of
confidentiality of submitted information; the 1972 amended statute
expressly guaranteed confidentiality of proprietary data; and the 1978
amendments provided that proprietary data would be used to evaluate
competitors’ registration applications and revealed to the public after a
ten-year confidentiality period.86 Monsanto argued that it had invested
millions of dollars in producing the registration data, and public disclosure
81

Id. at 968, 972 n.12.

82

See, e.g., Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1006-10; Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24,
37-38 (1st Cir. 2002).
83

7 U.S.C. § 136 (2006).

84

Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1003-04.

85

Id. at 998.

86

Id. at 991-96.
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and use in competitors’ registrations granted “[its] competitors a free
ride.”87
[24] The Court ruled that the EPA’s disclosure of data submitted after
1978 or before 1972 does not constitute a taking, because Monsanto had
notice of the manner in which the EPA would use and disclose any data.88
Monsanto, faced with the choice of either submitting the data or foregoing
a license to market its pesticides, had voluntarily chosen to submit its
data.89 Monsanto thus had no reasonable investment-backed expectation
that its trade secrets submitted during these periods would remain secret
and retain their value.90 The Court further found the investment-backed
expectations to so overwhelm the other Penn Central factors as to be
dispositive, and thus no taking had occurred.91 The Court held that this
regulatory scheme was not an unconstitutional condition on Monsanto’s
right to do business, “for such restrictions are the burdens we all must bear
in exchange for ‘the advantage of living and doing business in a civilized
community.’”92 Nevertheless, public disclosure of data submitted between
1972 and 1978 would constitute a taking due to the 1972 FIFRA’s express
statutory promise of confidentiality, which created so strong a reasonable
investment-backed expectation as to again dispose of the takings question
without resort to the other Penn Central factors.93
[25] Court precedent is thus clear that if licensing regulations require
offshore drilling companies submit health, safety and environmental data
87

Id. at 999.

88

See id. at 1006-09.

89

See id.

90

See Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1006-09; see also Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 37374 (7th Cir. 1953) (discussing how actual secrecy is a definitional aspect of trade secrets).
91

Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1005-06.

92

Id. (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 422 (1922) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)).
93

See id. at 1005-06, 1010-12.
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and offer no guarantee of confidentiality, companies that voluntarily
submit proprietary data have no claim of a taking or of an unconstitutional
condition.94
B. Effectiveness of Preemptive Lawsuits Before Disclosure
[26] Whereas the takings issue is easily disposed of when a company
discloses its trade secrets first and then files suit, the question of a
company filing suit ex ante is considerably more difficult to answer.95
This distinction hinges upon the company’s reasonable investment-backed
expectations; where the company has voluntarily submitted its proprietary
information in the absence of an express promise of confidentiality, it has
severely compromised its investment-backed expectations of that
information’s competitive value.96
[27] Early cases appear to support the government’s right to force
public disclosure. In the 1919 decision of Corn Products Refining Co. v.
Eddy, the Supreme Court held that a table syrup manufacturer could be
required by state law to publicly reveal the names and percentages of each
ingredient used in its secret syrup recipe without violating the Takings
Clause.97 The Court held it “too plain for argument that a manufacturer
94

See id. at 1006-07; see also Tri-Bio Lab., Inc. v. United States, 836 F.2d 135, 139-41
(3d Cir. 1987) (finding a taking due to reasonable investment-backed expectations based
on an express regulatory guarantee of confidentiality); Chevron Chem. Co. v. Costle, 641
F.2d 104, 115-16 (3d Cir. 1981) (holding there was no taking of submitted data because
there were no reasonable investment-backed expectations in the absence of an express
statutory or regulatory promise of confidentiality); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 555 F.2d 82, 95 (3d Cir. 1977) (“A voluntary submission
of information by an applicant seeking the economic advantages of a license can hardly
be called a taking.”); Dep’t of Natural Res. v. Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp., 834 P.2d 134,
145 (Alaska 1991) (holding the public disclosure of valuable oil well data voluntarily
submitted was not a taking); N. States Power Co. v. N.D. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 502
N.W.2d 240, 247 (N.D. 1993) (holding the public disclosure of trade secret data
voluntarily submitted was not a taking).
95

See, e.g., Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24, 37-39 (1st Cir. 2002).

96

See id.

97

See Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Eddy, 249 U.S. 427, 431-32 (1919).
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. . . has no constitutional right to sell goods without giving the purchaser
fair information of what is being sold.”98 The Court reaffirmed its
decision in the 1937 case National Fertilizer Association v. Bradley,
upholding a fertilizer labeling statute.99
[28] In Pennzoil Co. v. Federal Power Commission, a case particularly
relevant to offshore drilling regulation, the Fifth Circuit grappled with a
Federal Power Commission (“FPC”) order requiring offshore natural gas
producers to publicly disclose volume and location data of their wells.100
In Pennzoil, drilling companies argued that a major purpose of leasing
tracts of ocean land from the federal government is to discover clues to the
potential productivity of nearby tracts for purposes of future leases, and
that disclosure of such data would enable competitors to free ride on
another’s investment.101 The court found against the FPC for its lack of
“thoughtful consideration” and apparent cavalier attitude towards stripping
industry of its trade secrets.102 Yet the court implied that upon proper
agency consideration and demonstration of public necessity, such
regulation is valid – even when challenged ex ante.103
[29] At the other end of the spectrum, the First Circuit in its 2002 Philip
Morris, Inc. v. Reilly decision ruled that a state law requiring tobacco
companies to disclose publicly all ingredients in their cigarettes, a
supremely valuable trade secret, was an unconstitutional taking of
property without compensation.104 The court distinguished Corn Products
98

Id. at 431.

99

Nat’l Fertilizer Ass’n, Inc. v. Bradley, 301 U.S. 178, 182 (1937).

100

Pennzoil Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 534 F.2d 626, 628-29 (5th Cir. 1976).

101

Id. at 629.

102

Id. at 632 (detailing three factors the FPC must consider in determining whether such
information should be publicly disclosed).
103

See id.; see also Superior Oil Co. v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, 563 F.2d 191, 205
(5th Cir. 1977) (reaching a decision similar to the holding in Pennzoil regarding the same
FPC order).
104

See Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24, 45-46 (1st Cir. 2002).
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by a narrow reading of the Supreme Court’s “fair information” language,
finding that fair information under the labeling statute in Corn Products
encompasses full disclosure of all ingredients due to that statute’s purpose
of preventing consumer deception, whereas fair information for purposes
of a statute directed to health and safety means something short of
disclosure of all additives.105 The court also distinguished Monsanto, in
which public disclosure of data submitted before 1972 or after 1978 did
not constitute a taking, because Monsanto had voluntarily submitted its
trade secrets without a reasonable expectation of confidentiality –
destroying its proprietary interest in the process – whereas Philip Morris
filed suit before submitting.106 The distinction between suit ex post and ex
ante carries a compelling logic: the investment-backed expectation
calculus is undoubtedly altered by the voluntary submission of proprietary
information without a guarantee of confidentiality.107
105

See id. at 40.

106

See id. at 37-38.

107

See id.; Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1007 (1984) (“[A] voluntary
submission of data by an applicant in exchange for the economic advantages of a
registration can hardly be called a taking.”); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Nuclear Reg.
Comm’n, 555 F.2d 82, 95 (3d. Cir. 1977). Although this timing distinction may seem
unfair – governmental usurpation of power is valid as applied to the naïve, who submit
proprietary data before filing suit – this result may merely illustrate the proper
importance of process. See Philip Morris, 312 F.3d at 38. On the other hand, the
Monsanto and Westinghouse courts properly ruled only on the narrow grounds of the
cases before them; they did not attempt, nor should they be read, to definitively announce
a rule regarding investment-backed expectations outside of that narrow class. See
Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1007; KARL. N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 38 (1930)
(“[T]he court can decide only the particular dispute before it; . . . all that is said is to be
read with eyes on that dispute. . . . Look to your own discussion, look to any argument.
You know where you would go. You reach, at random if hurried, more carefully if not,
for a foundation, for a major premise. But never for itself. Its interest lies in leading to the
conclusion you are headed for. You shape its words, its content, to an end decreed. More,
with your mind upon your object you use words, you bring in illustrations, you deploy
and advance and concentrate again. When you have done, you have said much you did
not mean. You did not mean, that is, except in reference to your point. You have brought
generalization after generalization up, and discharged it at your goal; all, in the heat of
argument, were over-stated. None would you stand to, if your opponent should urge them
to another issue. So with the judge. Nay, more so with the judge.”) (emphasis in
original). Reading too much into the narrow grounds cited might be misguided,
especially given the broad implications of some of the Monsanto and Corn Products
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C. Implications for Potential Regulation
of Deepwater Offshore Drilling
[30] Philip Morris presents an important consideration for potential
regulation of the offshore oil drilling industry.108 Judge Torruella,
authoring the lead opinion, held the investment-backed expectations in
Monsanto dispositive only due to an express statutory promise of
confidentiality.109 Thus, over a blistering concurrence,110 the lead opinion
found the forced public disclosure of cigarette ingredients a taking only
after analyzing the other two Penn Central factors.111 It held the statute
unconstitutional due chiefly to the character of the government action.112
Thus, the lead opinion would find, where no express promise of
confidentiality exists, a forced disclosure of trade secrets constitutional –
even when challenged ex ante – if frustration of investment-backed
expectations is not total and the character of the government action is
proper.113 The concurrence, by contrast, found the Massachusetts statute
unconstitutional due solely to frustration of investment-backed
expectations, finding that factor dispositive even without an express
confidentiality guarantee.114

language. See Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1007; see also Pennzoil Co., 534 F.2d at 632
(implying that the forced public disclosure of a trade secret was not invalid upon a proper
agency demonstration of need, despite filing suit before submitting data); Superior Oil
Co., 563 F.2d at 205 (implying a similar tenet as Pennzoil).
108

See Philip Morris, 312 F.3d at 45-46.

109

See id. at 33 n.5, 36, 38-39.

110

Id. at 48-49 (Selya, J., concurring) (“[T]he lead opinion seems to assume that when
Penn Central applies, stare decisis does not.”).
111

See id. at 33-35 & 33 n.5.

112

Id. at 44-45 (“If I was convinced that this regulation was tailored to promote health
and was the best strategy to do so, I might reconsider our analysis. . . . [T]he character of
the government action determines the case.”).
113

See id.

114

See Philip Morris, 312 F.3d at 48-49 (Selya, J., concurring).
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[31] Potential offshore oil drilling regulations may drive a wedge
between the Philip Morris opinions.115 The lead opinion held the cigarette
ingredient disclosure statute invalid due to the character of the government
action, specifically regarding doubts that indiscriminate public disclosure
of all ingredients, dangerous or benign, served the purported government
purpose of promoting health and safety.116 By contrast, regulation
requiring public disclosure of data relating specifically to health, safety,
and environmental hazards in offshore drilling would not suffer the same
character-of-the-government-action infirmity.117 Many policy reasons
support agency disclosure of data to the public.118 Outside scientific
investigation is often the only way to ensure unbiased research targeting
issues affecting health and safety.119 Furthermore, after the failure of the
oil industry and regulatory agencies in the Gulf oil spill, Alaska, and
elsewhere, the need for public disclosure is overwhelmingly great.120

115

See id. at 45-46 (“The Disclosure Act causes the tobacco companies to lose their trade
secrets, entirely, and appellants advance no convincing public policy rationale to justify
the taking itself.”) (emphasis added).
116

See id.

117

See id. at 45 (suggesting the validity of a Minnesota statute requiring public disclosure
only of specific dangerous cigarette additives); see also Noranda Exploration, Inc. v.
Ostrom, 335 N.W.2d 596, 629-30 (Wis. 1983) (finding forced public disclosure a taking
due to the character of the government action only because the regulation did not advance
the governmental purpose).
118

See Thomas O. McGarity & Sidney A. Shapiro, The Trade Secret Status of Health and
Safety Testing Information: Reforming Agency Disclosure Policies, 93 HARV. L. REV.
837, 841-43 (1980) (arguing that agency confidentiality precludes peer review, hinders
the ability to attract or develop top scientific talent within agencies, and causes bias in
scientific evaluation and dangerous mistakes in approvals).
119

See Press Release, Harvard School of Public Health, Three Harvard School of Public
Health Alumni Named to New FDA Tobacco Advisory Committee (March 3, 2010),
available
at
http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/news/press-releases/2010-releases/hsphalumni-named-to-new-fda-tobacco-advisory-committee.html (“‘The Harvard School of
Public Health is in a unique role to contribute to FDA regulation of tobacco products, as
we have one of the only research centers in the nation that has conducted and published
extensive work on the design and addictiveness of the actual product.’” (quoting Gregory
N. Connolly, Tobacco Products Scientific Advisory Committee).
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Thus, even if other courts were to follow the First Circuit’s lead,
regulation requiring limited public disclosure of health, safety, and
environmental data would properly serve a legitimate governmental
purpose, and would likely be valid under Monsanto and Philip Morris,
even when challenged ex ante.121
V. EXACTIONS DOCTRINE AND TRADE SECRETS
[32] Further grounds exist for regulation mandating public disclosure of
health, safety, and environmental data in offshore drilling: drilling
companies lease the tracts of ocean land from the federal government.122
Thus, even if regulation requiring public disclosure were held invalid
when challenged ex ante, the government may be able to accomplish
through contract or property what it could not by regulation.123 The
contract for lease of a tract of ocean land could contain an express
agreement to assign to the government the proprietary interest in any data
specific to that locale.124

120

See sources cited supra notes 3-6.

121

See Stanley H. Abramson, Confidential Business Information Versus the Public’s
Right to Disclosure—Biotechnology Renews the Challenge, 34 KAN. L. REV. 681, 699700 (1986) (proposing limited public access to proprietary health, safety, and
environmental data in the biotech industry for a limited period, on EPA premises, and
only by demonstrated non-competitors). It would further appear that, in deepwater
offshore drilling, where tremendous liability and public fallout can accrue through a
mishap, regulated companies could perceive an “‘average reciprocity of advantage’” in
being subject to transparent health, safety, and environmental regulation. Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 140 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(citation omitted); see Connelly, supra note 70, at 251–55 (urging Justice Rehnquist’s
“average reciprocity of advantage” standard for evaluating takings of trade secrets, and
using such to justify the Westinghouse decision (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
122

See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-32 (2006); Pennzoil Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 534 F.2d 627,
629 (5th Cir. 1976).
123

See 43 U.S.C. § 1332.

124

See id.
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[33] Examination of the mandatory public disclosure of proprietary
health, safety, and environmental data through the lens of land use law
reveals that regulating deepwater leaseholders’ exploitation of the mineral
rights in their real property possibly implicates the exactions doctrine in a
manner that regulation of foods,125 pesticides,126 and cigarettes127 does not.
Subpart A of Part V attempts to extrapolate the Supreme Court’s prior
exactions decisions to the possible avenues by which courts might extend
exactions jurisprudence as it relates to the mandatory public disclosure of
trade secrets. It also argues that the arbitrary land-use criterion should not
limit the exactions doctrine. Rather the exactions doctrine should extend
to the mandatory disclosure of trade secrets, at least in the adjudication
context. Subpart B explores the implications of exactions jurisprudence
for conditioning the permitting of a leaseholder’s drilling and exploration
activities upon the disclosure of proprietary data. It then argues that most
instances of mandatory public disclosure will satisfy the nexus and
proportionality requirements of the exactions doctrine. Subpart C explores
the validity of the federal government expressly conditioning its leasing of
the ocean subsoil and seabed upon a contractual obligation to publicly
disclose health, safety, and environmental data. Finally, Subpart D
advances policy arguments for why the exactions doctrine, even if applied
to deepwater drilling regulation mandating public disclosure, should not
invalidate such regulation.
A. Extrapolation from Existing Exactions Decisions
1. Requirement of Land Use
[34] Nollan and Dollan both involved conditioning the grant of land
development permits upon a grant of an interest in that parcel of land,
leading to the interpretation that the exactions doctrine only applies to
doubly landed exactions.128 Yet there is nothing inherent limiting the
125

See Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Eddy, 249 U.S. 427, 431 (1919).

126

See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984).

127

See Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24, 45-46 (1st Cir. 2002).

128

See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 388-91 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal
Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 834-37 (1987).
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exactions doctrine to land development permits alone, nor to exactions of
interests in land.129 The basic purpose of the exactions doctrine is to
prevent the government from unfairly leveraging a petitioner’s chance
need of a permit as a pretext to extract constitutionally protected property
without compensation.130 The exactions policy furthers a principal
purpose of the Takings Clause of the Constitution, which is “to bar
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole.”131 All that is required, in theory, to implicate the exactions
doctrine’s underlying policy is that the government exaction demand
property protected under the Takings Clause.132 This includes any
property that the government is without constitutional authority to
confiscate without compensation.133
[35] Four prototypical scenarios present themselves as potential
candidates for being subject to the exactions doctrine.134 These scenarios
represent the possible combinations of the two basic “landedness” factors
of potential exactions: whether the permitting petition is to improve land,
and whether the exaction the government demanded in exchange is of an

129

Neither Dolan nor Nollan contains language expressly limiting the exactions doctrine
to land development permits or land interests. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 388-91; Nollan,
483 U.S. at 834-37; see also Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1003 (stating that the Supreme Court
has found intangible interests to be property for purposes of the Takings Clause).
130

See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 390 (“‘The distinction, therefore, which must be made between
an appropriate exercise of the police power and an improper exercise of eminent domain
is whether the requirement has some reasonable relationship or nexus to the use to which
the property is being made or is merely being used as an excuse for taking property
simply because at that particular moment the landowner is asking the city for some
license or permit.’” (quoting Simpson v. North Platte, 292 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Neb.
1980)).
131

Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).

132

See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 383-84, 388-91.

133

See id.

134

See id.
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interest in land.135 Thus, as illustrated in Figure 1, four scenarios are
possible: (1) the requested permit is for development of land the petitioner
owns,136 and the exaction is for an interest in land (both “landed”); (2) the
permit is not for land development but the exaction is for an interest in
land (one “landed”); (3) the permit is to develop land the petitioner owns
but the exaction is for Takings-Clause-protected property other than land
(one “landed”); and (4) neither the permit is for land development nor is
the exaction for an interest in land (neither “landed”).137 As noted, Nollan
and Dolan involved the first scenario, in which both the petition and the
exaction involved the petitioner’s land.138 Monsanto, by contrast,
involved the fourth scenario, in which neither the requested permit – to
market pesticides – nor the exaction the government demanded – public
disclosure of trade secrets – concerned land.139

135

See id. at 386-88.

136

See id. at 377 (stating that the petitioner challenged the approval of a building permit,
where such approval was conditioned “on the dedication of a portion of her property for
flood control and traffic improvements”).
137

See id. at 383-84, 388–91.
Land
Development

Non-Land
Development

Land Exaction

(1)
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Figure 1
138

See id. at 377; Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 827 (1987).

139

See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-05 (1984). Note that the trade
secrets in Monsanto did constitute property protected by the Takings Clause of the
Constitution. Id. at 1003-04.
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[36] The Supreme Court decided Monsanto before Nollan, and the
Court did not explicitly analyze the case through the exactions doctrine.140
Nonetheless, courts conceivably could apply the exactions doctrine and its
requirements of essential nexus and rough proportionality to any of the
above four types of scenarios.141 It is likely that courts will at the very
least limit the doctrine to interests marginally related to land, for both
policy and political reasons.142 However, courts should extend application
of the exactions doctrine to non-land-use scenarios. As previously noted,
there is no inherent distinction between land use and non-land use for
purposes of exactions.143 If the exactions doctrine is in fact a logical
application of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, and its policies
sound, then its logic should not be artificially cabined by the arbitrary
criterion of land use. The doctrine should thus apply in cases of trade

140

See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836-37; Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1003-05.

141

See ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE,
LAW, AND SOCIETY 905 (4th ed. 2010) (stating that “‘no rigid rules’ or ‘set formula’ are
available to determine where [valid] regulation ends and [invalid] taking begins” (citation
omitted)).
142

See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538 (2005) (describing the context
in which the exactions doctrine applies as the “special context of land-use exactions”);
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841 (“[O]ur cases describe the condition for abridgement of property
rights through the police power as a ‘substantial advanc[ing]’ of a legitimate state
interest. We are inclined to be particularly careful about the adjective where the actual
conveyance of property is made a condition to the lifting of a land-use restriction, since in
that context there is heightened risk that the purpose is avoidance of the compensation
requirement, rather than the stated police-power objective.”); PLATER ET AL., supra note
141, at 900-01, 929 (describing the intense political machinations motivating takings
disputes and alluding to the effect and power of “property rights advocates” in advancing
the Nollan and Dolan cases to the Supreme Court). The Supreme Court has already taken
a step to limit the application of the exactions doctrine, declining to apply it to challenged
regulatory actions not involving the conditioning of a permit grant upon exactions and
emphasizing its special context of land-use. See Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S.
687, 702 (1999) (“Although in a general sense concerns for proportionality animate the
Takings Clause, we have not extended the rough-proportionality test of Dolan beyond the
special context of exactions–land-use decisions conditioning approval of development on
the dedication of property to public use.”) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
143

See supra notes 129-133 and accompanying text.
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secret takings, such as Monsanto.144 Nevertheless, in situations where the
exaction is the disclosure of health, safety, and environmental impact data,
the essential nexus and proportionality requirements of the exactions
doctrine are usually satisfied. Thus, the exactions doctrine, while
applicable to situations involving deepwater drilling, will only work at the
margins.
2. Legislative Versus Adjudicatory Action
[37] As noted in Part II, there is ample basis for cabining the exactions
doctrine to individualized adjudicatory actions.145 The Supreme Court in
Nollan and Dolan emphasized the adjudicatory nature of the agency
actions struck down in those cases, and subsequent Supreme Court cases
have emphasized this seemingly essential element.146 Furthermore,
exactions jurisprudence is itself a special application of the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions.147 As the Court explained in Dolan, the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions in the special context of exactions
provides that the government may not require a person to forfeit a
constitutional right – the right to not have property confiscated – in
exchange for a “discretionary benefit conferred by the government” where
the benefit has little or no relationship to the property.148 By labeling the
exchanged-for government benefit as “discretionary,” the Court implies an
individualized adjudicatory action, not a purely legislative rule applying
broadly and equally, without distinction, to an entire class of parties.149
144

See Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1003-07.

145

See supra Part II.

146

See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 547 (characterizing the holding in Dolan as applying to
adjudicative action); Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841.
147

See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 547; Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385.

148

Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385 (emphasis added); see Lingle, 544 U.S. at 547.

149

See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 547; Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385; Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd.
of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445-46 (1915) (distinguishing individual adjudication
from general legislation based on the effect on individuals rather than the broad class);
Yesler Terrace Cmty. Council v. Cisneros, 37 F.3d 442, 448 (9th Cir. 1994) (“First,
adjudications resolve disputes among specific individuals in specific cases, whereas
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3. Application to Deepwater Oil Drilling
[38] The land-use aspects of deepwater oil drilling might significantly
affect the application of the exactions doctrine. Depending on the
situation, such drilling may or may not involve land use.150 Specifically, if
the government were to condition the granting of a drilling and
exploration permit for land already leased by the drilling company on an
exaction of trade secrets, this would be an example of the third scenario
previously identified – the permit is for land use development but the
exaction is for property other than land.151 By contrast, if the government
were to condition the ocean-land leases on an express contractual
obligation upon the lessee to publicly disclose health, safety, and
environmental information, it would likely be an example of the fourth
scenario, in which neither the requested permit nor the exaction relate to
land the petitioner already owns.152
rulemaking affects the rights of broad classes of unspecified individuals. Second,
because adjudications involve concrete disputes, they have an immediate effect on
specific individuals (those involved in the dispute). Rulemaking, in contrast, is
prospective, and has a definitive effect on individuals only after the rule subsequently is
applied.”) (internal citations omitted); see also supra note 60 and accompanying text.
150

See Comm’r of Internal Revenue v. Sw. Exploration Co., 350 U.S. 308, 315 (1956).

151

See supra para. 35.

152

Note that postregulation acquisition, though ordinarily irrelevant to Penn Central
takings and exactions analysis, is material in this unique situation of leasing federal lands.
See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 616, 630 (2001) (holding that
postregulation acquisition is not a bar to Penn Central takings claims); Nollan v. Cal.
Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 833 n.2 (1987) (holding that a plaintiff’s rights were not
altered by having acquired the property after the government’s public announcement of
its intention to condition permits on the transfer of easements, because the plaintiff
acquired the full property rights of the prior owner of the property). Unlike in Palazzolo
and Nollan, where title and all legal claims were transferred from the prior landowner to
the plaintiff, here, the government is itself the prior owner and lessor of the ocean land.
See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 630; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 833 n.2. Governmental declarations
of leasing conditions on ocean land may not be viewed logically as diminishing the
government’s own interest as landowner, and thus no conveyable legal right to challenge
the regulation exists here. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 630; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 833 n.2.
This then is that unique circumstance where Justice Brennan’s dissent in Nollan speaks
for the majority as well, where the title taker by postregulation acquisition is indeed on
notice of the conditions upon the property. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 860 (Brennan, J.,
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[39] The form of potential deepwater drilling regulation – whether
legislative or adjudicatory – will also significantly affect the application of
the exactions doctrine. Regulation crafted in purely legislative form
would likely avoid the exactions doctrine entirely. Thus, a statute or
agency rule that provides – in a manner requiring little interpretation – that
all applicants for drilling and exploration must, as a class, publicly
disclose certain specified data, such as the geological composition and
structure of a drilling area, or the volume, pressure, location, and
composition of oil reserves drilled, would likely not be evaluated under
the exactions doctrine. By contrast, a rule or statute carrying a more
general mandate – e.g., the disclosure of information critical to health,
safety, and the environment – would require further agency interpretation
and tailoring to individual drillers in its application within licensing
proceedings. Such disclosure requirements would tend more toward
adjudication and would, at least in this respect, fall within the ambit of
exactions jurisprudence.
B. Conditioning a Permit to Explore and Drill on
Proprietary Data Disclosure
[40] It is possible to reread the Monsanto decision in light of, and
consistent with, the subsequent Nollan decision and to hold the exactions
doctrine applicable to the Monsanto situation.153 In Nollan, the Court
stated that the taking of property, which would otherwise undoubtedly be
unconstitutional, is valid when attached to a development permit and when
satisfying the exactions doctrine.154 Monsanto may be read to say just the
dissenting) (arguing that, at the time of purchasing the new developments, Nollan was
“on notice that new developments would be approved only if provisions were made for
lateral beach access”).
153

See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 836–37 (1987); Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-05 (1984).
154

See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836 (“Although such a requirement, constituting a permanent
grant of continuous access to the property, would have to be considered a taking if it were
not attached to a development permit, the Commission’s assumed power to forbid
construction of the house in order to protect the public’s view of the beach must surely
include the power to condition construction upon some concession by the owner, even a
concession of property rights, that serves the same end.”).
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same, that (except during the years of the express statutory promise of
confidentiality) Monsanto was forced to convey valuable property as a
proper exercise of the EPA’s valid authority to outright prohibit the sale of
Monsanto’s pesticides, and that the requirements of essential nexus and
rough proportionality between such mandatory disclosure and the purpose
of such prohibition were satisfied.155 In other words, the Court may have
been applying the nascent exactions doctrine to that case – though an
example of the fourth scenario of non-land use – without saying as
much.156
[41] In the case of deepwater oil drilling, the permit to explore and drill
is actually a land use restriction, an example of the third exaction scenario
previously identified.157 If the exactions doctrine should be read to apply
in Monsanto and is to be applied in similar cases, such as the marketing of
food158 and cigarettes,159 then a fortiori it must be adhered to in land use
regulation such as oil drilling. If courts apply the exactions doctrine to the
case of regulatory agencies conditioning the grant of a permit to drill and
explore upon the public disclosure of health, safety, and environmental
data, two requirements must be met.160 First, the agency must possess the
authority to prohibit drilling and exploring outright.161 Second, the
probable impacts of the proposed drilling and exploration would need to
be compared to the benefits of the public disclosure of such data and
evaluated for an essential nexus as well as rough proportionality.162
155

See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 391 (1994); Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837;
Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1004.
156

See Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1003-05; see also Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391; Nollan, 483 U.S.
at 836-37.
157

See supra para. 35.

158

See Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Eddy, 249 U.S. 427, 431-32 (1919).

159

See Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24, 45-46 (1st Cir. 2002).

160

See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836-37.

161

See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836-37.

162

See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
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[42] The relevant agency, the Mineral Management Service (“MMS”),
most likely possesses the authority to prohibit drilling and exploration
outright, pursuant to its statutory mandate to prevent negative impacts on
safety and the environment.163 Furthermore, the MMS could likely
establish an essential nexus between the impacts of the proposed drilling
and exploration and the required exaction of disclosing proprietary health,
safety, and environmental information to the public.164 As previously
mentioned, public disclosure possesses many benefits that aid in effective
oversight of health, safety, and environmental risk mitigation.165
However, the unknown nature of the impacts of the proposed drilling
might complicate this essential nexus. Thus, it is merely the suspected
impacts that share a nexus with such public disclosure. Nonetheless, there
is probably a significant enough risk of public harm in all cases of drilling
and exploration to satisfy the nexus requirement.166
[43] The closer call would probably be the rough proportionality
requirement.167 As the Supreme Court made clear in Dolan, no
mathematical precision is necessary in evaluating this proportionality.168
163

See 43 U.S.C. § 1332(3)-(4) (2006) (naming the outer Continental Shelf a vital
national resource held by the Federal Government for the public and declaring it the
policy of the United States to protect coastal and non-coastal areas from negative impacts
of exploration and drilling on marine, coastal, and human environments); § 1351(a)-(c)
(requiring the submission of a development and production plan to the Secretary before
undertaking any development and production and detailing safety and environmental
safeguards); 30 C.F.R. §§ 250.201 to 250.202 (2010) (detailing the plans and information
that must be submitted before conducting any activities on an outer Continental Shelf
lease).
164

See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836-37.

165

See McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 118, at 841-43.

166

See § 1332(4) (“[E]xploration, development, and production of the minerals of the
outer Continental Shelf will have significant impacts on coastal and non-coastal areas of
the coastal States, and on other affected States.”) (emphasis added). This would appear
to amount to a Congressional finding of significant impacts in all cases of exploration,
development, and production. See id.
167

See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.

168

See id.
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Nevertheless, there must be findings of the potential impacts of the drilling
and the benefits of public disclosure, and an evaluation of their
proportionality.169 How to reach these findings and weigh them against
one another is a matter open to question.170
[44] If evaluated from a numerical perspective, the difficulty is that the
impacts of drilling and exploring seabed and subsoil of an undisclosed
nature are unknown.171 Shall the MMS predict the expected value of
unknown impacts based simply on the location of the lease and nothing
more? It is probably not an overstatement to say that any relation such an
estimation has to reality would be by mere chance. Perhaps a solution is
that the MMS could require the disclosure in confidentiality of all relevant
health, safety, and environmental data, and using that confidential
information make a finding as to the likely impacts of the proposed
drilling and exploration.172 Whether the MMS must distill those impacts
into dollar amounts is unresolved.173

169

See id. Note that the proportionality requirement is not between the financial burden
upon the petitioner of extinguishing trade secrets and the impacts of the proposed drilling
and exploration. See id. The financial burden upon the petitioner is not a factor in the
reasoning laid out in Dolan. See id. (noting that the proper inquiry is the relationship in
nature and extent between the impact of the proposed development and the benefits of the
required dedication). The relevant constitutional consideration, rather, is whether the
exacted dedication functions as a substitute for the outright prohibition of the petitionedfor development, both in nature and extent. See id. See generally Nollan, 483 U.S. at
836-37. It would nonetheless be interesting to consider whether an exorbitant exactions
requirement upon the petitioner, in the presence of less expensive alternatives, would run
afoul of substantive due process requirements.
170

See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391 (“[T]he city must make some sort of individualized
determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the
impact of the proposed development.”).
171

See supra note 4 and accompanying text.

172

See supra para. 21.

173

See generally Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391 (making no mention of using the dollar amount
of impacts in the constitutional calculus).
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[45] The benefits of the exaction – public disclosure of health, safety,
and environmental information – are similarly difficult to quantify.174
Public disclosure improves agency decision-making, removes industry
bias, and opens up to peer review the scientific inquiry into impacts and
mitigation techniques.175 It also adds transparency, prodding regulators
toward diligent oversight and providing a deterrent against ignoring their
duty.176 What is the monetary or other value of this improved oversight,
in a quantitative sense?177 The temptation to suggest a low amount based
on the uncertain gain is tempered in this instance by the myriad
preventable damages resulting from the Deepwater Horizon blowout:
human health harms with unknown future consequences for affected
persons in coastal states, especially as a result of dispersants used; entire
economies of fishing, boating and tourism destroyed, at least temporarily;
ecosystems devastated for an unknown number of years into the future.178
The only thing almost certain in this situation is that quantitative findings
will be heavily dependent on who is making the finding.179 The number of
externalized costs swept into the calculation, or overlooked, will likely
determine the existence or lack thereof of a rough proportionality between
the likely impacts and the benefits of the exaction.180

174

See id. at 385-86.

175

See McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 118, at 841-43.

176

See id. at 843-44.

177

See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.

178

Your Maritime Lawyer, Oil Spill Commission’s Final Report Finds Deepwater
Horizon Disaster Was Preventable, Urges Critical Industry And Government Reforms,
GULF COAST MAR. (Jan. 12, 2011), http://www.gulfcoastmaritime.com/weeklyspotlight/
oil-spill-commissions-final-report-finds-deepwater-horizon-disaster-was-preventableurges-critical-industry-and-government-reforms/2386/.
179

See generally The Use -- and Misuse -- of Statistics: How and Why Numbers Are So
Easily Manipulated, U. PA. (Apr. 2, 2008), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/
article.cfm?articleid=1928 (explaining some examples of statistical fallacies).
180

See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.

36

Richmond Journal of Law and Technology

Vol. XVII, Issue 4

[46] However, there is sound reason in the proposition that, because the
exaction in this case is specifically to disclose information bearing on the
risks of the proposed drilling and exploration, there is an inherent
qualitative, definitional proportionality in such a comparison.181 The
proportionality requirement is between the burden the regulated activity
places upon society on the one hand, and the benefit that the exaction will
bring society on the other.182 In the case of deepwater drilling, the MMS
need only disclose the information necessary to determine the risks of
drilling; thus the benefit of society’s possessing health, safety, and
environmental information is conceptually identical to the severity of
those same risks.183 This identity of scope should be sufficient to satisfy
the Dolan Court’s language and intent, that “[n]o precise mathematical
calculation is required,” only individualized findings indicating a rough
proportionality.184 Thus, courts should indeed find the requisite rough
proportionality in such a mandatory public disclosure, either through a
finding of comparable values of benefits and impacts, or through a logical
syllogism inherent in the majority of such mandatory disclosures.185
C. Lease Containing Express Contractual Provision for Data Disclosure
[47] If the government were to condition the lease of tracts of ocean
land upon the disclosure of any health, safety, and environmental data, it
181

See id.

182

See supra note 169 and accompanying text.

183

See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391. The difficulty with this reasoning is that an alternative to
public disclosure exists – though arguably less effective – in the form of confidential
disclosure to the agency. See McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 118. Thus, we might be
confronted with the question, when evaluating proportionality, of whether to weigh the
benefit of the exaction relative to available alternative exactions, or to weigh the
exaction’s benefit with respect to a baseline of inaction. See supra note 169. Precedent
might resolve this question, however, as the Court in Dolan did not seem to require
consideration of other feasible alternatives in evaluating proportionality. See 512 U.S. at
388-91. Dolan merely required that the exaction substitute for an outright prohibition,
both in nature and extent. See id.
184

Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.

185

See id.
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appears exceptionally unlikely that courts would find the exactions
doctrine implicated.186 This is the scenario most similar to Monsanto, in
which the Supreme Court appeared to evaluate the trade secret takings
question simply from a regulatory takings standpoint.187 Nonetheless, it is
possible to read that decision in light of the exactions doctrine later
expounded in Nollan and Dolan.188
[48] If the exactions doctrine is applicable to the Monsanto decision
(and it should be), then the doctrine also finds application in the case of
deepwater drilling with a land lease expressly conditioned upon the
forfeiture of trade secrets.189 The government would need to show the
ability to prohibit the leasing of the property outright, and the essential
nexus and rough proportionality requirements would need to be met.190
While in the case of deepwater drilling the essential nexus and rough
proportionality requirements would likely be satisfied, it appears unlikely
that courts would extend the exactions doctrine to such a scenario
unrelated to land use.191
D. Policy Arguments
[49] The exactions doctrine, though applicable, should not inhibit the
disclosure of health, safety, and environmental data. The Supreme Court
in Nollan and Dolan declared that exactions in land-use carry the risk of
being merely a pretext to avoid the compensation requirement of a valid
exercise of eminent domain.192 In the case of potential regulation

186

See id. at 388-91; Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 836-37 (1987).

187

Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-05 (1984).

188

See supra paras. 40-41.

189

See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 388-91; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836-37; Monsanto, 467 U.S. at
1003-05.
190

See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836-37.

191

See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.

192

See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 390; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841.
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requiring the disclosure of health, safety, and environmental data relating
to proposed deepwater drilling and exploration, little possible pretext
exists.193 To the contrary, the public would simply want reasonable
assurance of safety from the very risks the drilling threatens.194 Where the
demanded exaction of property is solely to mitigate the risks that the
property holder is causing, a court should find the requirements of the
exactions doctrine satisfied.195
[50] Furthermore, the exactions doctrine, like the takings doctrine,
functions “to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the
public as a whole.”196 In the case of mandatory disclosure of health,
safety, and environmental information related to proposed deepwater
drilling and exploration, there is no public burden that an individual or
group is forced to bear.197 The only burden existing in such a case is the
need to ensure the safety of the petitioner’s own plan to drill and explore;
the need for the proprietary data is merely to safeguard from the impacts
of that drilling.198 For this reason, the exactions doctrine should not bar
such regulation.199

193

See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 390; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841.

194

Although exceptional circumstances might raise the possibility of an ulterior motive
for the public’s desire for oil-drilling proprietary information (such as the energy crisis of
the 1970s, during which Congress and agencies demanded proprietary natural gas
reserves data to determine domestic energy supplies), the norm for wanting health, safety,
and environmental data is not such. Just as the Supreme Court cabined the exactions
doctrine to adjudication – though in exceptional circumstances a legislative rule could
also implicate concerns of pretext – a rule should not be fashioned from the exception
here. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 390; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841.
195

See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 390; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841.
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VI. CONCLUSION
[51] Congress and the relevant agencies could likely design regulation
requiring offshore drilling interests to reveal information necessary for
ensuring public safety and preventing unreasonable health or
environmental risks. Mandatory confidential submission to government
agencies is undoubtedly valid. Limited public disclosure is also
constitutional, though uncertainty exists as to the application of the
exactions doctrine to trade secrets: the possible streams of analysis by
which courts may measure such regulation have been explicated, and
suggestions made. It is hoped that these streams may offer some guidance
to Congress and the relevant agencies in forging a legal path for effective
regulation of deepwater drilling, and to the courts sitting in review.
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